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Abstract: This paper uses the opening of the US textile/apparel market for China at the end of
the Multifibre Arrangement in 2005 as a natural experiment to provide evidence for positive assor-
tative matching of Mexican exporting firms and US importing firms by their capability. We identify
three findings for liberalized products by comparing them to other textile/apparel products: (1) US
importers switched their Mexican partners to those making greater preshock exports, whereas Mexi-
can exporters switched their US partners to those making fewer preshock imports; (2) for firms who
switched partners, trade volume of the old partners and the new partners are positively correlated;
(3) small Mexican exporters stop exporting. We develop a model combining Becker-type matching
of final producers and suppliers with the standard Melitz-type model to show that these findings are
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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, a growing body of research has focused on heterogeneous firms and trade. A
robust finding that only firms with high capability (productivity/quality) will engage in exporting and
importing has spurred new theories emphasizing gains from trade associated with firm heterogeneity
(Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum, 2003).1 These theories consider trade liberal-
ization as the key mechanism linking trade and industry performance because it improves aggregate
industrial performance by shifting resources to more capable firms within industries (e.g., Pavcnik,
2002). These new trade theories have been applied to various issues and centered in trade research
over the last decade.2
In contrast to our current knowledge regarding the firms that trade, we have little information re-
garding the exporters and importers involved in trade, i.e., the process of matching between exporters
and importers in a product market. Do exporters and importers match based on their respective ca-
pabilities? Does trade liberalization change this matching process in any systematic way? Does
matching matter for the aggregate industrial performance? This paper is one of the first attempts to
answer these questions empirically.
Workhorse trade models consider types of international trade wherein the matching between ex-
porters and importers does not play an important role. Perfectly competitive models such as the
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models do not predict any systematic matching pattern because ex-
porters and importers are indifferent regarding with whom they trade in equilibrium.3 The “love
of variety” model also avoids positing any specific matching mechanism, instead predicting that all
exporters will trade with all importers.
However, actual matching patterns significantly differ from those predicted by these workhorse
trade models. The two graphs in Figure 1 illustrate how Mexican exporters trade with US importers
in two HS6 digit textile/apparel product markets. Each small dot on the left side represents a Mexican
exporter, whereas each small dot on the right side represents a US importer. Product A has slightly
more firms than an average textile/apparel product that Mexico exports to the US, whereas Product
B has fairly larger numbers. Each line connecting an exporter and an importer represents a “match”
whereby the exporter and the importer transacted the product during June–December 2004. Both
graphs clearly indicate that most firms traded with only one firm, that is, matching is approximately
one-to-one. Though the graphs show some deviations from this pattern of one-to-one matching,
these deviations constitute only a small share of the aggregate trade volume. Section 2 presents
1See, for example, Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999) for such findings that motivated the theories.
2See survey papers e.g., Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007; 2012) and Redding (2011) for additional papers
in the literature.
3Because of this prediction, perfectly competitive models are sometimes called “anonymous market” models.
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the trade volume by “main-to-main” matches, defined as matches where both the exporter and the
importer are each other’s largest main partner; this trade volume constitutes approximately 80 percent
of the aggregate Mexican textile/apparel exports to the US. This means that one-to-one matching
between main partners is a good approximation of trade relationships in a given product market.
Thus, understanding firms’ choice of main partner is crucial for understanding trade at the product
level.
We develop a model combining the canonical one-to-one matching model of Becker (1973) with
a standard Melitz-type heterogeneous firm trade model to examine the mechanism determining im-
porters’ and exporters’ choices of their main partners. The model has final producers (importers) and
suppliers (exporters), both of whom are heterogeneous in capability. A final producer and a supplier
form a team under perfect information. These teams compete in a monopolistically competitive mar-
ket as in Melitz-type models. Since team-level capability depends on team members’ capabilities,
the resulting matching determines the distribution of team capability. In our benchmark case wherein
members’ capabilities exhibit complementarity within teams, stable matching becomes positively as-
sortative by capability where highly capable exporters match with highly capable importers, while
low capability exporters match with low capability importers.
Furthermore, we analyze trade liberalization that enables more foreign suppliers to enter the coun-
try of the final producer. The model exhibits a new adjustment mechanism undertaken by industries
in response to trade liberalization. The Becker-type matching model indicates that positive assortative
matching is a market outcome that depends on the capability distributions of final producers and sup-
pliers. Trade liberalization enables foreign suppliers to enter the market, which in turn changes the
capability distribution among suppliers available to final producers in the market. Existing matching
becomes unstable as some final producers switch to these new foreign suppliers. This in turn induces
existing firms to systematically change partners so that the resulting new matching distribution be-
comes positive assortative under the new capability distribution. Final producers switch to partners
with higher capability, while incumbent suppliers switch to partners with lower capability. This shift
in matching toward assortative matching not only leads to an efficient use of technology exhibiting
complementarity but also improves the aggregate industrial performance at the world level under nor-
mal circumstances. In short, the model identifies rematching between buyers and suppliers as a new
source of gains from trade liberalization associated with firm heterogeneity.
We assess this implication of Becker-type positive assortative matching by investigating how the
matching behavior of US importers and Mexican exporters responds to the entry of Chinese suppliers
into the US market, induced by the end of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in 2005. The end of
the MFA provides an ideal experiment because the US removed import quotas, followed by increases
in Chinese exporters for some textile/apparel products but not others. Using firms’ preshock trade
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volumes in 2004 as a proxy for capability, we find that for products subject to US binding quotas
on imports from China, US importers more frequently switched from their Mexican main partner to
one with higher capability, whereas Mexican suppliers more frequently switched from their US main
partner to one with lower capability compared to switching behavior observed in other textile products
not subject to binding quotas. We do not find systematic partner changes in the other direction.
Furthermore, among those who switched main partners, the rank of the new partners is positively
related with the capability of the old partners. These findings strongly support the existence of Becker-
type positive assortative matching. In addition, we present numerous additional analyses to support
the robustness of our results and to reject possible alternative explanations.
Our empirical results have several implications for trade research and policy discussions. First,
our findings support the matching approach to modeling international trade pioneered by James Rauch
and his coauthors. Casella and Rauch (2002), Rauch and Casella (2003), and Rauch and Trindade
(2003) modeled trade as matching between exporters and importers to analyze information frictions
that complicate matching. While these models consider that firms pick a match based on horizon-
tally differentiated characteristics, we find that firms pick a match based on vertically differentiated
capability (e.g., Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Sugita 2014).4 Second, our findings are
related to a recent debate over the size of gains from trade associated with firm heterogeneity (e.g.,
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare, 2012; Melitz and Redding, 2014a, 2014b).5 Though the
current debate has mainly focused on gains from reallocation of production factors among firms (e.g.,
Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al. 2003), our findings suggest another type of gains from trade associated
with firm heterogeneity. Third, we find that importers with high capability are “good importers” with
whom all exporters prefer to trade, but only those with high capability can in fact trade with them.
This finding supports policy discussions emphasizing the importance of encouraging domestic firms
not only to start exporting but also to export to high capable importers. This view that all importers
are not equally valuable to exporters in a non-anonymous market is also shared by a recent random
network model by Chaney (2014).
Our paper is also related to the growing body of empirical literature that uses customs transaction
data to examine matching between exporters and importers. As pioneering studies, Blum, Claro, and
Horstmann (2010, 2011) and Eaton, Eslava, Jinkins, Krizan, and Tybout (2012) document character-
istics of exporter–importer matching in Chile–Colombia trade, Argentina–Chile trade, and Colom-
bia–US trade, respectively. Bernard, Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe (2013), and Carballo, Ottaviano,
4Antras et al. (2006) presents a model where heterogeneous workers match internationally, whereas Sugita (2014)
presents a model where Melitz-type heterogeneous firms match internationally. Our model is basically a partial equilibrium
version of Sugita (2014). Sugita (2014) also shows that the positive assortative matching between exporters and importers
explains stylized facts on exporters, importers, and unit prices in a unified framework.
5Our mechanism is also different from that of Melitz and Redding (2014a) where the reallocation of production factors
among firms occurs in each of multiple production stages.
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and Volpe Martincus (2013) use the Norwegian customs data and the customs data of Costa Rica,
Ecuador, and Uruguay to examine exports from one country to multiple destinations. These stud-
ies mainly define exporter–importer matching at the country-pair level and document cross-sectional
facts on the number of exporters for an importer together with the number of importers for an ex-
porter. We define matching more narrowly at the product level and identify a theoretical mechanism
determining product-level matching by examining how matching behavior responds to a trade liber-
alization shock. Section 2 presents that our finding is compatible with the findings of aforementioned
studies by replicating some of their key findings under their definition of matching. Benguria (2014)
and Dragusanu (2014) find positive correlations for firm-level variables (employment, revenue, etc.)
of exporters and importers for France–Colombia trade and India–US trade, respectively. However,
none of these studies relates observed correlations to the Becker-type positive assortative matching.
Section 4.4 presents the comparison of these correlation tests with our empirical test. Finally, re-
garding dynamic characteristics of matching, Eaton et al. (2012) and Machiavello (2010) conduct
pioneering studies on how new exporters acquire or change buyers in Colombian exports to the US
and in Chilean wine exports to the UK, respectively. While these two studies consider steady state
dynamics, we focus on how matching responds to a specific shock to a market. The above-mentioned
empirical studies propose different theoretical mechanisms to explain their findings, but none pro-
pose Becker-type positive assortative matching. Note that our treatment–control group comparison
can identify only the existence of the Becker-type mechanism; however, it is silent about the existence
of other mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our data set and shows statistics
indicating that exporter–importer matching at the product level is approximately one-to-one. Sec-
tion 3 develops a model of matching of exporters and importers and derives predictions that will
be confirmed in later sections. Section 4 explains our empirical strategies. Section 5 presents the
main empirical results together with additional results for checking the robustness of the main results.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Mexico-US Textile Apparel Trade
2.1 Matched Exporter Importer Data
We used the administrative records held on every shipment crossing the Mexican border from June
2004 to December 2011 to construct matched exporter–importer data for Mexican textile/apparel
exports to the US, which ranges from HS50 to HS63 in the 2 digit HS code. The Appendix explains
the construction of the dataset. The dataset contains the following information for each Mexican
exporter and US importer pair that trade in a HS6 product in a year: (1) exporter-ID; (2) importer-
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ID; (3) year of transaction; (4) the 6 digit HS product code; (5) value of annual shipment (in US
dollars); (6) quantity and unit; and (7) an indicator of whether their trade is processing reexports
(Maquiladora/IMMEX); and other information.
Some information was dropped from the dataset. First, we dropped exporters who are individuals
or courier companies (e.g., FedEx, UPS, etc.) because we focus on firm to firm matching. Second, as
the dataset contains information only from June to December for 2004, we dropped observations from
January to May for other years to make each year’s information comparable.6 Third, we dropped one
product where the number of importers unreasonably fluctuates, suggesting low data quality.7
Finally, we dropped transactions by exporters who do not report importer information for most
transactions. For a given HS6 product and a given year, we dropped an exporter from the final
data if the total value of transactions without importer information constituted more than 20 per-
cent of the exporter’s annual export value. This resulted in dropping approximately 30–40 per-
cent of exporters and 60–70 percent of export values. Most of these dropped exporters engage in
processing reexports, called Maquiladora/IMMEX exports, and Mexican customs do not mandate
Maquiladora/IMMEX exporters to report importer information.8 However, in practice and in our
data, many Maquiladora/IMMEX exporters report importers’ information, which enables us to com-
pare Maquiladora/IMMEX exporters and other normal exporters.
2.2 Exporter Importer Matching at Product Level
2.2.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the matching between Mexican exporters and US importers for
HS6 digit level textile/apparel products. We dropped products traded by only one exporter or only one
importer in any year during 2004-07 as these products do not have a potential matching problem.9
Rows (1) and (2) report statistics on the number of exporters and importers in one product market
(HS6 digit level), respectively. Rows (3) and (4) are statistics on the number of exporters selling a
6We conducted our main analysis (Tables 2 and 6) without conducting the latter two operations and obtained similar
results.
7We dropped hs code 570210 where the number of US importers were 5 in 2004, 4 in 2005, 254 in 2006, 532 in 2007,
3 in 2008 and 123 in 2009.
8The Maquiladoras program is a government export promotion program, replaced by the IMMEX (Industria Manufac-
turera, Maquiladora y de Servicios de Exportation) program in 2006. In the Maquiladoras/IMMEX program, firms in Mex-
ico can import materials and equipments duty free if the firms export products assembled using them. Maquiladora/IMMEX
exports are mostly outsourcing contracts between Mexican manufacturers and foreign (in most cases US) buyers. To be
eligible for the Maquiladora/IMMEX programs, exporters must register the foreign buyers’ information in advance. This
registration means that exporters do not need to report foreign buyers’ details for each shipment. We show in Section 2.2.2
that non-Maquiladora trade and Maquiladora trade show very similar patterns in terms of Main to Main trade shares in Table
2. Similar patterns are found for number of partners. These suggest that a sample selection problem that could potentially
arise from the exclusion of data is likely to be small.
9These dropped products constitute 3-7% of total textile/apparel trade volume in each year.
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product to an importer and the number of importers buying a product from an exporter, respectively.
Table 1 presents that matching between exporters and importers significantly differs from the
predictions derived from the conventional “love of variety” model. As this model predicts that all
exporters sell to all importers, the numbers in Rows (1) and (2) can be interpreted as the “love of
variety” model’s predictions regarding the number of exporters selling to a typical importer and the
number of importers buying from a typical exporter, respectively. Compared with these predictions,
the actual numbers given in Rows (3) and (4) are extremely small. While the predicted numbers are
11–15 sellers and 15–20 buyers for the mean (6–8 sellers and 9–12 buyers for the median), more than
half of exporters and importers trade with only one partner. Furthermore, though some firms trade
with multiple partners, trade with one main partner is very important. Rows (5) and (6) show that
even these firms transact approximately 75 percent of their trade with a single main partner. Overall,
Table 1 shows that product-level matching of exporters and importers is approximately one to one.
2.2.2 Main-to-Main Shares
It is well established that exports by a few large firms constitute a large share of industrial exports.
Figure 1 and Table 1 do not consider this fact. Even though more than half of firms trade with a single
partner, trade by these firms may constitute only a small fraction of the aggregate trade volume.
We construct a new measure, “main to main share” to incorporate the heterogeneity in trade
volumes. For each product–year combination, we identify each firm’s “main partner,” i.e., the partner
with whom the firm trades the most. Then, we define “main-to-main trade” as trade in which the
exporter is the main partner of the importer and simultaneously the importer is the main partner of
the exporter. Finally, we define “main-to-main share” as the share of main-to-main trade out of the
total trade volume.
The “main-to-main share” expresses the extent to which overall transactions in one product mar-
ket are quantitatively close to one-to-one matching. If all exporters and importers trade with only
a single partner, this share takes the maximum value, which is one. If all nx symmetric exporters
trade with nm symmetric importers as in the “love of variety” model of trade in intermediate goods
with symmetric firms, this share takes 1/max{nm, nx}. Even if some large firms trade with multiple
partners, the main-to-main share is still close to one when these firms concentrate their trade with
their respective main partners.
Column (1) in Table 2 reports the main-to-main share for Mexico’s textile/apparel exports to the
US. The main-to-main share is approximately 80 percent, which is stable across years. Trade between
one-to-one matches of the main partners constitutes 80% of textile/apparel trade volumes. This means
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that understanding the mechanism determining one-to-one matching between main partners will lead
to understanding the mechanism determining 80 percent of aggregate trade volumes. In the remainder
of the paper, we provide theory and evidence for the mechanism determining firms’ choice of main
partner.
Other columns in Table 2 investigate whether high main-to-main share is due to unique features of
Mexican textile/apparel exports to the US. First, Mexican exports to the US contain a large amount of
processing reexports through Maquiladora/IMMEX programs. To be eligible for Maquiladora/IMMEX,
exporters must register importers in advance and these registration costs might lead firms to trade
with only a small number of partners. Columns (2) and (3) report the main-to-main share for
Maquiladora/IMMEX trade and other normal trade, respectively.10 These two types of trade show
very similar main-to-main shares. Thus, approximately one-to-one matching is not specific to the
processing trade. Second, in our data period, some Mexican textile/apparel products in the US mar-
ket experienced a drastic change in the level of trade protection. As section 4 will explain later, the
US imposed import quota on some textile/apparel products until 2004 under the Multifibre arrange-
ment. Since Mexican exports to the US are not subject to these quotas thanks to the NAFTA, they
are protected from competition with other countries, notably China. Columns (4) and (5) examine
whether high main-to-main share is related to high trade barriers or their removal. Column (4) re-
ports main-to-main share for products for which Chinese exports to the US were subject to binding
quotas until 2004 [see section 4.3 for the definition of quota binding], while column (5) reports for
other textile/apparel products. In both columns, main-to-main share is higher than 0.76 for all years.
Therefore, neither import quota nor their removal causes high main-to-main shares.
Two panels in Figure 2 draw the distribution of main-to-main share across product-year combi-
nations of HS 6 digit textile/apparel products and years 2004-2007. A histogram in the left panel
strikingly shows most products have higher main-to-main shares than 0.9. The median is 0.97 and
25 percentile is 0.86. As the love of variety model with symmetric firms predicts main-to-main share
equals 1/max{nm, nx}, main-to-main shares might be related to the number of firms. To examine
this, the right panel in Figure 2 plots main-to-main shares against the maximum of the number of
exporters and that of importers, max{nm, nx}. An estimated Lowess curve is above 0.80 and almost
horizontal, which implies that main-to-main share is not related with the number of firms.
10To calculate columns (2) and (3), we treat Maquiladora/IMMEX trade and other normal trade in a given hs 6 digit
product as two different products. This means that numbers in column (1) does not necessarily fall between numbers in
columns (2) and (3).
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2.2.3 Comparison with Previous Studies
Recent years have seen a rise in the literature on matching between exporters and importers, using
customs transaction data. Previous studies by Blum et al. (2010, 2011), Eaton et al. (2012), Bernard
et al. (2013), and Carballo et al. (2013) all find that the number of partners is an important margin
for explaining firm heterogeneity in trade volume. Does our finding of approximately one-to-one
matching contradict these studies that emphasize “partner margins”?
In fact, our finding is compatible with these previous studies mentioned above. First, these studies,
excluding Carballo et al. (2013) and our study, use a different definition of matching. They define
a match at the country level, while we define it at the product–country level.11 Specifically, in their
definition, an exporter and an importer form a match in a given country if they trade a product with
each other, while in our definition, an exporter and an importer form a match in a given product and
a given country pair if they trade the product with each other. If every firm traded only one product,
these two definitions would identify an identical set of matches. Since in reality, a number of firms
trade multiple products, our definition of matching is strictly narrower than the one in these previous
studies and identifies fewer partners for firms trading multiple products.
Second, if we define a match at the country level, as in these previous studies, we are able to
replicate previous findings with our data. First, in Table 1, we find lower mean numbers of exporters
selling to an importer and of an importer buying from an exporter than the values reported by Blum et
al. (2010, 2011), Bernard et al. (2013), and Carballo et al. (2013). When we calculate these numbers
under these studies’ definitions, the numbers increase and become similar to their findings. Second,
Blum et al. (2010, 2011) and Bernard et al. (2013) find a negative correlation between the number
of partners per exporter and the number of partners per importer. Following Table 3.2 in Blum et al.
(2010) and Figure 5 in Bernard et al. (2013), we calculate the following for each Mexican exporter:
(X) the number of US buyers that the exporter trades with, and (Y ) the average number of Mexican
partners for these US buyers. Thereafter, we run a regression of (Y ) on (X) with the constant term.
We find a significant negative slope, −0.115 (s.e. 0.018), for 2004, which is comparable to the
value of −0.13 (s.e. 0.01) for Norwegian exporters found by Bernard et al. (2013).12 Therefore,
our analysis of one-to-one matching of exporters and importers at the product-country level has no
conflict with previous analyses of partner margins at the country level.
11Carballo et al. (2013) also examines the number of buyers per exporter at the product-destination level. They primarily
focus on the number of buyers and share of the main buyers for exporters. However, they do not analyze the number of
sellers for importers.
12When we define a match at the product level and run a similar regression with product fixed effects, the negative
correlation becomes much weaker and even becomes insignificant for some years. For instance, the slope of the regression
for 2004 is -0.036 (s.e. 0.029).
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3 The Model
This section has three aims: (1) to develop a model combining a canonical Becker (1973) model of
one-to-one matching with a standard Melitz-type heterogeneous firm trade model, (2) to explain that
the sorting of exporters and importers has implications for the impact of trade liberalization on the
aggregate industrial performance and the ;
the model’s implications for the novel effect of trade liberalization on the aggregate industrial
performance, and (3) to derive predictions from the model that will be tested in later sections of the
paper.
3.1 A Matching Model of Exporters and Importers
We develop a matching model of team production.13 The model includes three types of firms, namely,
US final producers, Mexican suppliers, and Chinese suppliers. A US final producer matches with a
supplier from either Mexico or China to form a team that produces one variety of differentiated final
goods. Once teams are formed, suppliers tailor intermediate goods for a particular variety of final
goods; therefore, firms transact intermediate goods only within their team. Each firm joins only one
team.
Firms’ capabilities are heterogeneous. Capability reflects either productivity or quality, depending
on the model’s other parameters. Let x and y be the capability of final producers and suppliers,
respectively. There is a fixed mass MU of final producers in the US, MM of suppliers in Mexico,
and MC of suppliers in China. The cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) for the capability of US
final producers is F (x) with support [xmin, xmax]. The capability of Mexican and Chinese suppliers
follows an identical distribution, and the c.d.f. is G(y) with support [ymin, ymax]. The maximums
xmax and ymax may be positively infinite (e.g., F and G may be Pareto distributions). An identical
capability distribution of Chinese and Mexican suppliers is assumed for the graphical expositions of
comparative statics results. For simplicity, a Chinese supplier is a perfect substitute for a Mexican
supplier of the same capability.
The model has two stages. In Stage 1, final producers and suppliers form teams under perfect
information. After teams are formed, in Stage 2, they compete in the US final good market in a
monopolistically competitive fashion.
Teams’ capabilities are heterogeneous. Team capability θ(x, y) is an increasing function of team
members’ individual capability, θ1 ≡ ∂θ(x, y)/∂x > 0 and θ2 ≡ ∂θ(x, y)/∂y > 0. Matching
endogenously determines the distribution of team capability.
13Our model is a partial equilibrium version of Sugita (2014) wherein firm entry is endogenous and international match-
ing arises from Ricardian comparative advantage in a two-country general equilibrium model.
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The US representative consumer maximizes the following utility function:
U =
δ
ρ
ln
[ˆ
ω∈Ω
θ(ω)αq(ω)ρdω
]
+ q0 s.t.
ˆ
ω∈Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dω + q0 = I.
where Ω is a set of available differentiated final goods, ω is a variety of differentiated final goods,
p (ω) is the price of ω, q(ω) is the consumption of ω, θ(ω) is the capability of a team producing ω,
α ≥ 0 is a parameter on how demand responds to capability (product quality), q0 is consumption of
a numeraire good, I is an exogenously given income, and δ expresses industry-wide demand shocks.
Consumer demand for a variety with price p and capability θ is derived as
q(p, θ) =
δθaσp−σ
P 1−σ
, P ≡
[ˆ
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−σθ (ω)ασ dω
]1/(1−σ)
(1)
where σ ≡ 1/ (1− ρ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution and P is the price index.
Production technology is of Leontief type. When a team produces q units of final goods, the team
supplier produces q units of intermediate goods with costs cyθβq + fy; then, using them, the final
producer assembles these goods into final goods with costs cxθβq + fx. The total costs for a team
with capability θ producing q units of final goods are
c(θ, q) = cθβq + f, (2)
where c ≡ cx + cy and f ≡ fx + fy. Each firm’s marginal costs are assumed to depend on the
entire team’s capability. This assumption is mainly for simplicity, but it also expresses externality
within teams that makes firms’ marginal costs to depend on their partner’s capability and their own
capability.14 Appendix provides examples.
Team capability θ may represent productivity and/or quality, depending on parameters α and β.
For instance, when α = 0 and β < 0, all teams face symmetric demand functions, while a team
with high capability has lower marginal costs. Teams behave as firms in the Melitz model, and
accordingly, θ may be called productivity. When α > 0 and β > 0, a team with high capability faces
a large demand at a given price and simultaneously pays high marginal costs. Teams behave as firms
in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and Johnson (2012) and θ may be called quality.
We obtain an equilibrium by backward induction.
14An example of a within-team externality is costs of quality control. Producing high quality final goods might require
extra costs of quality control at each production stage because even one defective component can destroy the whole product
(Kremer, 1993). Another example is productivity spillovers through teaching and learning (e.g. joint R&D) within a team.
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Stage 2 Team’s optimal price is p(θ) = cθβ/ρ. Hence, a team revenue R(θ), total costs C(θ), and
joint profits Π (θ) are
R(θ) = σAθγ , C(θ) = (σ − 1)Aθγ + f, and Π (θ) = Aθγ − f, (3)
whereA ≡ δσ
(
ρP
c
)σ−1
. Parameter γ ≡ ασ−β (σ − 1) summarizes how team capability affects joint
profits. Since comparative statics on parameters α, β, and σ is not our main interest, we normalize
γ = 1 by choosing the unit of θ. This normalization greatly simplifies the calculations below.
Stage 1 Firms choose their partners and decide how to split team profits, taking A as given. Profit
schedules, pix (x) and piy (y), and matching functions, mx (x) and my(y), characterize equilibrium
matching. A final producer with capability x matches with a supplier having capability mx (x) and
receives the residual profit pix (x) after paying profits piy (mx (x)) to the partner. Let my(y) be the
inverse function of mx(x) where mx(my(y)) = y and a supplier with capability y matches with a
final producer with capability mx(x).
We focus on stable matching that satisfies the following two conditions: (i) individual rationality,
wherein all firms earn non-negative profit, pix (x) ≥ 0 and piy (y) ≥ 0 for all x and y and (ii) pair-wise
stability, wherein each firm is the optimal partner for the other team member15
pix (x) = Aθ(x,mx(x))− piy(mx(x))− f = max
y
Aθ (x, y)− piy(y)− f
piy (y) = Aθ(my(y), y)− pix(my(y))− f = max
x
Aθ (x, y)− pix(x)− f. (4)
The first order conditions for the maximization in (4) are
Aθ2(x,mx(x)) = pi
′
y(mx(x)) and Aθ1(my(y), y) = pi
′
x(my(y)).
Using mx(x) = y and my(y) = x, the above first order conditions become
pi′x(x) = Aθ1(x,mx (x)) > 0 and pi
′
y(y) = Aθ2(my(y), y) > 0, (5)
which proves that profit schedules are increasing in capability.
Trade volume within a match T (x, y) is equal to supplier’s costs plus supplier’s profit. From (3)
15Roth and Sotomayor (1990) is an excellent textbook of matching models. Parameter A is given to individual firms,
but is endogenous at the market level. Therefore, stable matching considered here is an f−core of an economy having the
widespread externality of Hammond, Kaneko, and Wooders (1989). See this paper for the existence of an f−core.
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with γ = 1 and (5), T (x, y) turns to be increasing in member’s capability :
T (x, y) =
[cx
c
C(θ(x, y)) + fx
]
+ piy(y);
∂T
∂x
=
cx
c
(σ − 1)Aθ1 > 0 and ∂T
∂y
=
cx
c
(σ − 1)Aθ2 + pi′y(y) > 0. (6)
Because of fixed costs, a cut-off level of team capability θL exists such that only teams with
capability θ ≥ θL produce in the market. Simultaneously, capability cut-offs xL and yL exist such
that only final producers with x ≥ xL and suppliers with y ≥ yL participate in the matching market,
i.e. in international trade. These cut-offs satisfy
pix(xL) = piy(yL) = 0 and MU [1− F (xL)] = (MM +MC) [1−G(yL)] . (7)
The second condition in (7) indicates that the number of suppliers in the matching market is equal to
the number of final producers.
The sign of the cross derivative of a team’s joint profits, which is the sign of the cross derivative
θ12, is known to determine the sign of sorting in stable matching (e.g. Becker, 1973). For simplicity,
we consider three cases where the sign of θ12 is constant: (1) Case C (Complement) θ12 > 0 for all
x and y (i.e. θ is strictly supermodular); (2) Case I (Independent) θ12 = 0 for all x and y (i.e. θ is
additive separable); (3) Case S (Substitute) θ12 < 0 for all x and y (i.e. θ is strictly submodular).16
In Case C, we have positive assortative matching (PAM) (m′x(x) > 0): high capability firms match
with high capability firms whereas low capability firms match low capability firms. In Case S, we
have negative assortative matching (NAM) (m′x(x) < 0): high capability firms match low capability
firms. In Case I, we cannot determine a matching pattern (i.e. mx(x) cannot be defined as a function)
because each firm is indifferent about partner’s capability. Therefore, we assume matching is random
in Case I.17
We focus on Case C and Case I in the main text of the paper and discuss Case S in Appendix for
three reasons. First, our empirical analysis supports Case C but rejects Case I and Case S. Second,
16An example for Case C is the complementarity of quality of tasks in a production process (Kremer, 1993; Kugler and
Verhoogen, 2012; Sugita, 2014). For instance, a high-quality car part is more useful when combined with other high-quality
car parts. An example for Case S is technological spillovers through learning and teaching. Gains from learning from high
capable partners might be greater for low capability firms. See e.g. Grossman and Maggi (2000) for further examples.
17See e.g. Legros and Newman (2007) for a proof of this result. To understand the intuition, consider matching among
two final producers {X,X ′} and two suppliers {Y, Y ′}. Let their capability be x, x′, y and y′ where x > x′ and y > y′.
Then, consider how much extra team profits each final producer can produce by switching the supplier from Y ′ to Y . In
Case C, final producer X can produce more extra team profits than X ′ because θ12 > 0. Therefore, X can make a better
offer to Y than X ′ can and matches with Y (PAM). In Case S, final producer X’ can produce more extra team profits than
X because θ12 < 0. Therefore, X ′ can make a better offer to Y than X can and matches with Y (NAM). In Case I, both
final producers can produce exactly the same extra team profits because θ12 = 0. For matching to be stable, the difference
in profits between Y and Y ′ must be equal to this extra profits so that both X and X ′ are indifferent between Y and Y ′.
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Case I is a useful benchmark because it nests traditional Melitz-type models where firm heterogeneity
exists only in one side of the market, i.e. either among suppliers (θ1 = θ12 = 0) or among final
producers (θ2 = θ12 = 0). Finally, the analysis of Case S turns out to be much more complex than
the analysis of the other two cases.
In Case C, the matching function mx(x) is determined to satisfy the following “matching market
clearing” condition.
MU [1− F (x)] = (MM +MC) [1−G (mx(x))] for all x ≥ xL, (8)
The left hand side of (8) is the mass of final producers that have higher capability than x and the right
hand side is the mass of suppliers who match with them. Under PAM, these are suppliers with higher
capability than mx (x). Figure 3 describes how matching function mx(x) is determined for a given
x ≥ xL. The width of the left rectangle equals the mass of US final producers, whereas the width of
the right rectangle equals the mass of Mexican and Chinese suppliers. The left vertical axis expresses
the value of F (x) and the right vertical axis indicates the value of G(y). The left gray area is equal
to the mass of final producers with higher capability than x and the right gray area is the mass of
suppliers with higher capability than mx(x). The matching market clearing condition (8) requires the
two areas to have the same size for all x ≥ xL.
An equilibrium is obtained as follows (see Appendix for calculation). First, the matching market
clearing condition (8) determines matching function mx(x) for each x. Let θ(x, y) ≡ θx(x) + θy(y)
for additive separable Case I. Using mx, the index A is obtained as
A =
δ
σΘ
,
Θ ≡
MU
´∞
xL
θ (x,mx(x)) dF (x) for Case-C
MU
´∞
xL
θx(x)dF (x) + (MM +MC)
´∞
yL
θy(y)dG(y) for Case-I.
Using A from the last equation, equation (7) and the cut-off condition for teams, Aθ (xL, yL) = f,
determine two cut-offs, namely xL and yL.18
18Individual firm profits can be obtained by integrating the first-order conditions (5) with initial conditions (7):
pix(x) = A
ˆ x
xL
θ1(t,mx(t))dt and piy(y) = A
ˆ y
yL
θ2(my(t), t)dt.
The stability condition alone determines the distribution of profits within teams. This is a virtue of this class of matching
models with continuum of agents (Sattinger, 1979). We do not need to specify bargaining power parameters regarding how
to split the matching surplus within matches.
13
3.2 Matching as a Market Outcome
The Becker-type matching model explains assortative matching as a market outcome that depends on
the capability distributions of final producers and suppliers. By incorporating this property, the model
emphasizes the effect of trade liberalization on the aggregate industrial performance.
To see this point more clearly, we focus on Case C, i.e. positive assortative matching. Trade
liberalization enables foreign suppliers to enter the market and changes the capability distribution of
suppliers available to match with final producers. Some final producers prefer to switch partners to
foreign entrants (this is why foreign suppliers enter the market), whereby the old matches become
unstable. Firms change their partners so that the new matching becomes positively assortative at the
global level under the new capability distribution. Because technology θ exhibits complementarity,
this re-matching toward positive assortative matching leads to an efficient use of technology and
improves the aggregate industrial performance at the global level (e.g. global profits) under normal
circumstances.19
In the remainder of the paper, we empirically test this implication of the Becker-type PAM to
adjust prior matches following trade liberalization. More specifically, we consider what happens to
matching between US final producers and Mexican suppliers when the mass of Chinese suppliers
increases (dMC > 0). We continue to focus on Case I versus Case C. We discuss Case S in Appendix
and some alternative models in Section 5.3. For simplicity, we assume positive but negligible costs
for switching partners so that a firm changes its partner only if it strictly prefers the new match over
the current match.
When the mass of Chinese suppliers increases, some Mexican suppliers stop exporting to the US.
Some US final producers stop importing from Mexico, choosing instead to import from China. Others
remain in the Mexico-US trade. We now introduce the names of these groups of firms.
Definition 1. Consider Mexican suppliers and their partner US final producers before the exogenous
event of an increase in Chinese suppliers. (1) US final producers are called continuing importers
if they continue importing from Mexico after the event, and exiting importers if they stop import-
ing from Mexico after the event; and (2) Mexican suppliers are called continuing exporters if they
continue exporting to the US after the event, and exiting exporters if they stop exporting to the US.
In the following discussion, we focus on how continuing importers and exporters change their
partners in response to the Chinese entry into the US market.
In Case I, firms are indifferent about their partner’s capability. Even negligible switching costs
prohibit any change in matching. Continuing exporters and importers do not change their partners
because all incumbent firms are indifferent to them.
19Under these circumstances, a change in the market condition A does not offset the efficiency gain of re-matching.
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Proposition 1. If the mass of Chinese suppliers increases in Case I, then US continuing importers
and Mexican continuing exporters will not change their partners.
In Case C, continuing importers and exporters systematically change their match of firm to satisfy
the matching market clearing condition (8). Let m0x(x) and m
1
x(x) be the matching functions in an
old equilibrium and a new equilibrium, respectively. Figure 4 describes how a US importer with
capability x changes its partner. Area A in Figure 4 expresses US importers with capabilities higher
than x. They initially match with suppliers with higher capability than m0x(x) expressed by areas
B+C. After the entry of Chinese exporters, more suppliers at any given capability level are available
for US final producers. The original matches become unstable because some US final producers are
willing to swap their partners with new Chinese exporters. In the new matching, final producers in
area A matches with areas B +D that has an equal mass and represents suppliers having capabilities
higher than m1x(x). The figure shows that a US final producer with a given capability x switches its
main partner from the one with capabilitym0x(x) to the one with the higher capabilitym
1
x(x). We call
this change “partner upgrading” by US final producers. This in turn implies “partner downgrading”
by Mexican suppliers. The same figure also shows that Mexican suppliers with capability m1x(x)
used to match with final producer with strictly higher capability than x prior to the entry of Chinese
suppliers.
Proposition 2. If the mass of Chinese suppliers increases in Case C, then (1) US continuing importers
switch their Mexican partners to those with higher capability (partner upgrading) and (2) Mexican
continuing exporters switch their US partners to those with lower capability (partner downgrading).
The remainder of the paper will test Propositions 1 and 2.20
4 Empirical Strategies
Three types of data are needed to empirically test Propositions 1 and 2. First, we need an event that
increases the number of Chinese exporters in the US market. Second, we need rankings of capability
at the firm-product level. Finally, we need to track partner changes between US importers and Mex-
ican exporters. This section explains how we obtain these data and formulate an implementable test
of Propositions 1 and 2. We also explain the advantage of our test over the conventional “correlation
test” of assortative matching.
20We have assumed identical capability distributions of Chinese and Mexican suppliers to derive Proposition 2 using
the diagram. We note that Proposition 2 holds without this assumption. Under the general distribution, if some US final
producer with capability x that used to match with a Mexican supplier with capability y switches to some Chinese supplier,
then Proposition 2 holds for all US continuing importers with weakly lower capability than x and all Mexican continuing
exporters for weakly lower capability than y.
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4.1 End of the Multifibre Arrangement
The end of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in 2005 provides a shock of exactly the required type,
and that we modeled in the last section, namely a sudden increase in Chinese exporters of various
capability levels entering the US textile/apparel product markets (dMC > 0).
The MFA and its successor, the Agreement on Textile and Clothing, are agreements on quota
restrictions regarding textile/apparel imports among GATT/WTO member countries. At the GATT
Uruguay round, the US (together with Canada, the EU, and Norway) promised to abolish their quotas
in four steps. On January 1 of the years 1995, 1998, 2002, and 2005, the US removed various import
quotas. At each removal, liberalized products constituted 16, 17, 18, and 49% of imports in 1990,
respectively.
The end of the MFA in 2005 is a product-level liberalization of the US textile/apparel markets.
Quotas had already been removed for a roughly half of the relevant products before 2002, while the
other half underwent liberalization in 2005. Many HS2 digit chapters contain products liberalized in
2005 as well as those that had been previously liberalized and therefore did not experience any change
in 2005. This situation enables us to construct a treatment group (products liberalized in 2005) and to
compare it with a control group (other products) within HS2 digit chapters.
4.1.1 Surge in Chinese Exports to the US
The 2005 quota removal increased imports to the US, mostly from China. Brambilla, Khandelwal,
and Schott (2010) estimate that US imports from China disproportionally increased by 271% in 2005,
whereas imports from almost all other countries decreased.21 The left panel in Figure 5 displays
Chinese exports to the US for textile and apparel products (Chapters 50 to 63 of the Harmonized
System Codes) from 2000 to 2010. The vertical line in year 2005 represents the MFA quota removal.
The dashed line expresses the aggregate export volume of products upon which the US had imposed
binding quotas against Chinese exports until the end of 2004 (treatment group), and the solid line
indicates the export volume of other textile/apparel products (control group). After the 2005 quota
removal, exports of quota-removed products (shown by the dashed line) increased much faster than
those of other products (shown by the solid line).
21Seeing this substantial surge in import growth, the US and China had agreed to impose new quotas until 2008, but
imports from China never dropped back to the pre-2005 levels. This reflects the fact that (1) new quota system covered
fewer product categories than the old system (Dayaranta-Banda and Whalley, 2007), and (2) the new quotas levels were
substantially greater than the MFA levels (see Table 2 in Brambilla et al., 2010).
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4.1.2 Exports by New Chinese Entrants with Various Capability Levels
Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013) use Chinese customs transaction data to decompose the increases
in Chinese exports to US, Canada, and the EU after the quota removal into intensive and extensive
margins. They find that increases in Chinese exports of quota-constrained products were mostly
driven by the entry of Chinese exporters who had not previously exported these products. Further-
more, these new exporters are much more heterogeneous in capability than incumbent exporters, with
many new exporters being more capable than incumbent exporters.22 In our model, this entry of new
exporters at various levels of capability corresponds to an increase in the number of Chinese suppliers
dMC > 0 analyzed in the last section.
4.1.3 Mexican Exports Facing Competition from China
The removal of the MFA quotas significantly impacted Mexican exports. Mexico already had tariff-
and quota-free access to the US market through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).23
With the MFA’s end, Mexico lost its advantage to third-country exporters, thus facing increased com-
petition with Chinese exporters in the US market. The right panel in Figure 4 shows Mexican exports
to the US for quota-removed products for the treatment group (dashed line) and other textile/apparel
products (solid line; control group) from 2000 to 2010. The figure shows that the two series had
moved in parallel before 2005, whereas exports of quota-removed products significantly declined af-
ter 2005. The parallel movement of the two series before 2005 indicates the absence of underlying
differential trends between Mexico–US trade in both quota-removed products and other products.
This suggests that the choice of products for quota removal in 2005 was exogenous to Mexican ex-
ports to the US.
In sum, the MFA’s end in 2005 provides an ideal natural experiment for testing Propositions 1
and 2. It induced a large and arguably exogenous increase in the number of Chinese exporters with
various capability levels into the US market for roughly half of textile/apparel products, making the
other half a natural control group. 24
22Khandelwal et al. (2013) offer two pieces of evidence. First, while incumbent exporters are mainly state-owned firms,
new exporters include private and foreign firms. Private and foreign firms are typically more productive than state-owned
firms. Second, the distribution of unit prices for new entrants has a lower mean but a greater support than that of unit prices
of incumbent exporters. Khandelwal et al. (2013) show that these findings contradict with predictions of optimal quota
allocation and suggest inefficient quota allocations as the cause.
23Under NAFTA, the US market was liberalized to Mexican exports in 1994, 1999, and 2003.
24We further investigate this parallel underlying trend assumption in Section 5.2.1.
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4.2 Proxy for Capability Rankings
Capability rankings for US final producers and Mexican suppliers are needed for each product to test
Propositions 1 and 2. Estimating conventional capability measures such as total factor productivity
(TFP) is one possibility. However, estimating it at the firm-product level is not feasible even if we had
linked the current data set to typical firm-level data that researchers typically use to estimate TFP. As
we will explain in Section 4.4, using this method would therefore require currently unavailable data
and estimation methodology. Therefore, a different approach is utilized.
Note that in Case I, no firm should change their partners. If the data uphold Case I, this prediction
can be confirmed regardless of how we estimate firm capability rankings. Therefore, to test the
existence of Case C versus Case I, it is sufficient to find proxies of capability rankings that work if
the data uphold Case C.
To this end, we use a property of our model that a firm’s trade volume increases in line with
its capability in Case C. Remember that trade volume within a match T (x, y) is increasing in ca-
pability x and y [see (6)]. In Case C, matching is positively assortative and matching functions are
increasing, i.e. m′x(x) > 0 and m′y(y) > 0. Therefore, import volumes by US final producers
I(x) = T (x,mx(x)) increase in line with their own capabilities x as export volumes by Mexican
suppliers X(y) = T (my(y), y) increase in line with their own capability y.
This monotonicity is used to create a ranking for each product of US continuing importers by their
imports from their main partner in 2004. From the monotonicity of import volumes and capability
(I ′(x) > 0), this ranking should agree with the true capability ranking of US continuing importers.
Similarly, for each product we rank Mexican continuing exporters by their exports to their main
partner in 2004, which should also agree with the true capability ranking of Mexican exporters in
Case C.
We assume that the capability ranking in a fixed set of firms is stable during our sample period
2004–2007. Thereafter, we use the rank measured from 2004 data for the same firm throughout our
sample period 2004–2007. We measure the capability rankings only for Mexican continuing exporters
and US continuing importers that engaged in the Mexico–US trade between 2004 and 2007.
As a robustness check, we also create rankings based on total product trade volumes in 2004
aggregated across partners and rankings based on unit prices.25
25We prefer to use firms’ trade volumes with their main partners rather than firm-level total product trade volumes
aggregated across partners. The latter measure may not capture the ranking of profit opportunities for partners. For instance,
consider two importers. One imports an overall large amount by buying small amounts from many partners. The other
imports less overall but imports greater amounts from each seller. We think a typical exporter will regard trade with the
latter importer as being more profitable.
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4.3 Main Specification
Finally, we need to track partner changes between US importers and Mexican exporters, then isolate
partner changes due to Chinese firm entries. Accordingly, we estimate the following four regressions:
UpgradingUSigs = β1Bindinggs + λs + ε
m
igs
DowngradingUSigs = β2Bindinggs + λs + u
m
igs
UpgradingMexigs = β3Bindinggs + λs + ε
u
igs
DowngradingMexigs = β4Bindinggs + λs + u
u
igs, (9)
where i, g, and s index a firm, a HS6 digit product, and a sector (HS2 digit chapters), respectively.
We define dummy variables Upgradingcigs andDowngrading
c
igs as follows: Upgrading
c
igs = 1
(c = US,Mex) if during 2004-07, firm i in country c switched its main partner for product g to a
firm with a higher capability rank; Downgradingcigs = 1 (c = Mex,US) if during 2004-07 firm
i in country c switched the main partner of product g to a firm with a lower capability rank. By
construction, Upgradingcigs and Downgrading
c
igs are defined only for US continuing importers and
Mexican continuing exporters during 2004-07. Our sample for the regression analysis drops exiting
importers and exporters. The sample period of 2004-07 reflects the fact that the 2008 Lehman crisis
reduced Mexican exports to the US, potentially confounding the impact of the MFA’s end. Bindinggs
is a dummy variable indicating whether Chinese exports of product g to the US faced a binding quota
in 2004. Brambilla et al. (2010) constructed an indicator for binding quotas on Chinese exports to the
US for each HS-10 digit category.26 Since HS product categories of Mexico and the US are the same
only up to the first 6 digits, we aggregated their indicator up to the HS-6 digit level.27 λs represents
HS-2 digit-level sector fixed effects that control for unobservable and observable shocks during the
period at the broad sector level. ucigs and ε
c
ijs are error terms.
When we estimate (9), some observations are dropped. First, we drop products traded by only
one exporter or importer in 2004 as for these products, up/downgrading dummies are always zero by
26A quota is defined as binding if the fill rate, i.e. the realized import value over the quota value, is greater than 0.8. Our
results are robust to the choice of other cut-offs.
27We constructed our indicator as follows. Let xmg2004 be US imports of HS-10 digit product g from Mexico in 2004.
Let j be a HS-6 digit product and G(j) be the set of US HS-10 digit products in category j. Thereafter, we constructed a
dummy variable indicating whether Chinese exports of HS-6 digit product j to the US faced binding quotas in 2004 as:
Bindingj = I
{∑
g∈G(j) x
m
g2004I{g ∈ binding quota in 2004}∑
g∈G(j) x
m
g2004
≥ 0.5
}
, (10)
where the indicator function I{X} = 1 if X is true and I{X} = 0 otherwise. We chose the cut-off value as 0.5 but the
choice of this cut-off is unlikely to affect the results because most of values inside the indicator function are close to either
one or zero.
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construction. Second, we drop HS 2 sectors in which there is no variation of the binding dummy.28
The coefficients of interest in (9) are βi for i = 1, ..., 4. With HS-2 digit product fixed effects,
these coefficients are identified by comparing the treatment and control groups within the same HS-
2 digit sector level. The treatment is the removal of binding quotas on Chinese exports to the US
(Bindinggs = 1). The coefficient βi estimates its impact on the probability that firms will switch
their main partner to ones with higher or lower capabilities.
Proposition 1 for random matching in Case I predicts that in response to the entry of Chinese
exporters, continuing US importers and Mexican exporters would not change their partners. In reality,
other shocks inducing partner changes may exist. A virtue of our treatment-control group comparison
is that we can distinguish the effect of the MFA’s end from the effects of these other shocks if the latter
symmetrically affected both groups. Considering this point, we reformulate the prediction for Case
I: no difference should exist in the probability of partner changes in any direction between treatment
and control groups. In our regressions (9), this prediction corresponds to β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0.
Proposition 2 for PAM in Case C predicts that in response to the entry of Chinese exporters, all
continuing US importers upgrade whereas all continuing Mexican exporters downgrade their main
partners. Though the model with frictionless matching predicts all firms will change their partners,
other factors such as transaction costs are likely to exist that prevent some firms from changing part-
ners, at least in the short run. Again, our treatment-control group comparison can control for these
other factors as long as they symmetrically affect both groups. Accordingly, we reformulate the pre-
diction for Case C: US importers’ partner upgrading and Mexican exporters’ partner downgrading
will occur more frequently in the treatment group than in the control group. In our regressions (9),
this prediction corresponds to β1 > 0, β2 = β3 = 0, and β4 > 0.
4.4 Advantages over the “Correlation Test” of Assortative Matching
An alternative approach to test PAM is a type of “correlation test” that uses cross-sectional data to
determine whether the correlation of exporters’ and importers’ capability across matches is positive
or negative. The correlation test has been conventionally used in labor economics for analyzing many
topics such as marriage, education, worker sorting, and so on. For readers of these studies, our test
examining the response of matching to the entry of new suppliers may not appear a standard approach.
For the analysis of exporter–importer matching, however, our approach has several advantages over
the correlation test approach.
First, our test is able to identify the mechanism behind assortative matching. The correlation test
merely measures the sign of assortative matching but does not indicate the underlying mechanism.
28Dropped sectors are HS 50, 51, 53, 56, 57, and 59.
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Our approach of analyzing systematic partner changes in response to the entry of new suppliers,
however, enables us to test the key mechanism of the Becker-type positive assortative matching model.
Second, the correlation test would require us to estimate some capability measure such as TFP at
the firm-product level. In contrast to studies in labor economics where agents’ abilities are reasonably
observable, several difficulties arise in estimating capability for the analysis of exporter–importer
matching. Such estimation would require detailed information per firm about the production outputs
and inputs of each product, but information on inputs at the firm-product level is rarely available.
Furthermore, no established method exists for estimating firm capability in a matching market. For
instance, conventional estimation methods of TFP implicitly assume an anonymous market where
matching is irrelevant. This approach enables estimation of sellers’ productivity without using buyer
information. We are uncertain regarding biases that might arise if these conventional methods are
applied for firms in a matching market.
Third, instead of estimating capability, the correlation test could use proxy variables for measuring
capability, including firm-size variables such as sales or employment. Two caveats should be noted
for this approach. These firm-size variables have no variation at the firm-product level. Additionally,
the correlation test based on these firm-size variables may not be at all informative about the sign
for sorting true capability, and therefore may lead to an erroneous conclusion. For instance, in our
model, all Case i (i = I, S, C), including even Case S of NAM, predict a positive correlation between
exporters’ and importers’ employment across matches because an importer’s employment increases
along with volume of imported intermediate goods, which in turn increases the employment of the
exporter with whom the importer trades.29 This positive correlation arises from the complementarity
of the labor inputs in the Leontief technology, not from the complementarity of capability.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Regressions
Table 6 reports estimates of βi (i = 1, .., 4) from our baseline regressions for partner changes during
2004–07. The table shows the estimates of each coefficient from linear probability and probit mod-
els. Panels A and B report the results for partner changes by US importers and Mexican exporters,
respectively. In Panel A, Column (1) shows that the estimate of β1 under the linear probability model
is 0.052, which means that the removal of binding quotas from Chinese exports induced US importers
to upgrade their main partners more frequently by 5.2 percentage points. Column (2) shows that the
29This point is more evident for our trade volume-based capability rankings. If we took the correlation between exporters’
ranks and those of their respective main partners, it would be mechanically positive. We emphasize again that we are not
doing this in our paper.
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probit model gives a similar estimate.30 Columns (3) and (4) show that the end of the MFA’s impact
on partner downgrading for US importers is close to zero, which is statistically insignificant. In Panel
B, Columns (5) and (6) show that the impact on partner upgrading for Mexican exporters is also close
to zero, which is statistically insignificant. Columns (7) and (8) show that the removal of binding
quotas from Chinese exports increases the probability of partner downgrading for Mexican exporters
by 12.7 to 15 percentage points.
Overall, we find that β1 and β4 are positive and statistically significant. That is, partner upgrading
for US importers and partner downgrading for Mexican exporters occur more frequently in the treat-
ment group than in the control group. On the other hand, β2 and β3 are close to and not statistically
different from zero; no difference exists in probabilities of partner downgrading for US importers and
partner upgrading for Mexican exporters between treatment and control groups.31 These signs of the
estimates support PAM Case C and reject random matching Case I.
The removal of binding quotas from Chinese exports increased the probability of US importers
upgrading partners by 5.2 percentage points and the probability of Mexican exporters downgrading
partners by 12.7 to 15 percentage points. The quantitative magnitude might at first appear small.
However, they are substantial when compared with the probability of partner changes in the overall
sample. The probability of the US importer upgrading its partner in the sample is 3 percentage points,
and the probability of the Mexican exporter downgrading its partner in the sample is 15 percentage
points.
The positive estimate of β1 also implies a previously undocumented type of trade diversion in-
duced by NAFTA. Trade diversion is usually documented in terms of prices: with protection from
third-country imports (e.g., the MFA), a preferential trade agreement (e.g., NAFTA) induces im-
porters to buy goods from partner countries at high prices. Trade diversion thus takes a form of
“mismatching” of importers and exporters. Given MFA import quotas, NAFTA forced the US firms
to match with Mexican suppliers of lower capability. The end of the MFA enabled US firms to match
with Mexican suppliers of higher capability, even if they did not completely switch to Chinese ex-
porters. This dissolution of “mismatching” is a previously undocumented type of gain from trade
liberalization.
PAM among new partners The model with Case C predicts that PAM holds both before and af-
ter liberalization. Figure 6 confirms this prediction. In the left panel, the horizontal and vertical
axes draw the ranks of main partners in 2004 and 2007, respectively, for those US importers who
30This is also true for other equations in the paper. Thus, we report estimates from linear probability models in the
following.
31Section 6.4 shows that this lack of partner changes in opposite directions supports rejection of other alternative expla-
nations for the positive estimates of β1 and β4.
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change their main partners between 2004 and 2007. Firm ranks are divided by the possible max-
imum rank of the product (i.e. the number of firms) so as to fall in [0, 1]. The right panel rep-
resets similar normalized partner ranks in 2004 and 2007 for Mexican exporters. The lines repre-
sents OLS regressions of normalized 2007 partner ranks (Y ) on normalized 2004 partner ranks (X):
Y = − 0.24
(0.048)
+ 0.44
(0.12)
X (R2 = 0.13) for US importers and Y = − 0.25
(0.036)
+ 0.74
(0.13)
X (R2 = 0.24) for
Mexican exporters where standard errors in parentheses. Figure 6 and regressions show significant
positive relationships. That is, firms who match with relatively high capable partners in 2004 continue
to match with relatively high capable partners in 2007 as PAM predicts.32
5.2 Robustness Checks
5.2.1 Different Time Periods
Choice of End Year Panel A in Table 7 reports estimates of β1 and β4 by fixing the initial year as
2004 and changing the end year to 2006, 2007, or 2008. This exercise has two aims. First, it shows
that the documented higher probabilities of partner upgrading by US importers and partner down-
grading by Mexican exporters in the liberalized products are not sensitive to the choice of end year.
All estimated coefficients on β1 and β4 in Table 7 are positive and statistically significant. Second,
this shows a gradual adjustment between old and new equilibriums. Column (1) finds β1 = 0.036
for 2004–06 data much smaller than the value β1 = 0.052 found for the 2004–07 data in Column
(2). This means that the impact of liberalization on US importer’s partner upgrading substantially
increases from 2006 to 2007, suggesting that partner changes occur gradually, probably due to certain
transaction costs. Similarly, the estimate of β4 increases from 0.056 for 2004–06 data in Column (4)
to 0.127 for 2004–07 data in Column (5).
Differential Background Trends Panel B in Table 7 reports estimates of β1 and β4 by fixing the
end year to 2011 and changing the initial year to 2007, 2008, or 2009. This exercise aims to check our
crucial assumption: the markets of products previously subject to binding quotas and the markets of
other products would have behaved similarly if the MFA quota were maintained. If instead these two
product groups had differential background time trends in partner changes, positive estimates of β1
and β4 may arise from these differential trends instead of the causal effect of the end of MFA quotas.
Figure 4 demonstrates the absence of differential time trends in the aggregate export volumes before
the MFA quota removal in 2005. Unfortunately, this check cannot be conducted at the firm level as
our data contain information only from June 2004. Therefore, we conduct another check.
32Figure combine both the treatment and control groups since the model predicts PAM for both groups. Simialr positive
relationshps continue to hold if similar figures are drawn for each group separately.
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For each period with a different initial year from 2007 to 2009, we construct a capability ranking
based on trade volume in the new initial year and recreate the upgrading/downgrading dummies. If our
positive estimates of β1 and β4 for 2004–2007 arise from differential time trends, these regressions
with different initial years are likely to continue to find positive significant estimates for β1 and β4.
On the other hand, if our positive estimates of β1 and β4 for 2004–2007 capture the causal effect of the
MFA quota removal and if the adjustment of matching to a new equilibrium is mostly completed by
2007, we should not observe any positive and significant estimates for β1 and β4 for the regressions
of later years.
Panel B in Table 7 shows the results. We find very small and insignificant estimates for β1 and β4
for 2007–2011 [Columns (7) and (10)] and 2009–2011 [Columns (9) and (12)]. These results support
our assumption. For the period 2008–2011 [(Columns (8) and (11)], both β1 and β4 have slightly
greater point estimates than other periods, though they are still much smaller than the estimates from
our main regressions for 2004–2007, and β4 becomes statistically significant. One possible reason for
the sizable difference between 2008–2011 and the other two periods is the effect of the Lehman crisis
and the Great Trade Collapse of 2008-09. As exports from other countries, Mexican exports declined
by a huge amount in the second half of 2008. This shock might introduce noise into the rankings.
Overall, we find no evidence that potential differential trends across product groups account for our
baseline results.
5.2.2 Additional Controls
Table 4 report estimates of β1 and β4 from regressions (9) including additional control variables.
Columns (1) and (4) reproduce our baseline estimates from Table 6 for reference. A unique fea-
ture of the Mexico–US trade is its inclusion of a substantial amount of duty free processing trade
(Maquiladora/IMMEX). If the systematic partner changes previously identified occur only in Maquiladora
and IMMEX trade and not in other normal trade, our findings may be specific to the Mexico–US trade
and would have limited implications for other countries. To check this point, columns (2)–(3) and
(5)–(6) include the share of Maquiladora trade in the firm’s trade in the product with the main partner
in 2004 and its interaction with the binding dummy. With controls on Maquiladora trade, estimates
of P1 and P4 still remain statistically significant and similar in magnitude. Furthermore, the coeffi-
cients of the interaction terms are insignificant, which means that the partner changes occur both in
processing and normal trade.
We also consider the possibility that the MFA quota removals are exogenous as they were sched-
uled before China began expanding its exports. However, which products were liberalized in 2005
might be correlated with product or industry characteristics that vary within a HS2 digit chapter. The
lower panel of Table 4 presents the results of our analysis that controls for the difference in transaction
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size, product characteristics, and geography between the treatment and control groups. Columns (7)
and (10) include trade volume of the product with the main partner in 2004. Columns (8) and (11)
include dummies on whether products are for men, women, or not specific to gender and those on
whether products are made of cotton, wool, or man-made (chemical) textiles.33 Columns (9) and (12)
include Mexican state dummies of the location of Mexican exporters. With these additional controls,
estimates of β1 and β4 remain statistically significant and similar in magnitude.
5.2.3 Alternative Capability Measures
Rankings of exporters and importers based on trade volume with their main partners in 2004 are used
to measure capability. Although this is in line with our theoretical framework, we estimate our main
regressions using two alternative rankings.
The first alternative ranking is based on the total product-level trade volume of a firm aggregated
over partners. Columns labeled “Total Trade” reports estimates using this ranking. As Table 2 sug-
gests, most firms concentrate their trade volume around their trade with their main partners. There-
fore, our baseline ranking based on trade volume with the main partners and an alternative based on
total product volume yield very similar results.
The second alternative ranking is based on the unit price of the product’s trade with the main
partner. If the exporter size is mainly explained by their quality rather than productivity, the unit price
rankings may agree with the true capability ranking of exporters. On the other hand, if exporter size
is mainly explained by productivity, unit price rankings may become the exact reversal of exporters’
true capability rankings. If Case C holds, we should observe β2 > 0, β3 > 0 and β1 = β4 = 0
instead.
Using unit prices poses the difficulty that even within a narrowly defined product category, dif-
ferent firms may report their quantities in different units of measurement (square meters, kg, pieces,
etc.). Since one exporter consistently uses the same unit for one product in our data, we treat transac-
tions of one product reported in one unit and those of the same product reported in a different unit as
transactions of two different products.
Columns labeled “Price” report estimates using this ranking and confirm the main results. Both
β1 and β4 are positive and significant, while β2 and β3 are insignificant. These results suggest that
exporters are on average ranked by product quality. This is consistent with the previous finding that
high quality is an important determinant of firm exports.34 In addition to this previous finding, our
33These product characteristics dummies are essentially for apparel products. Since HS-2 digit categories for textile
products are defined in terms of differences in materials, HS-2 digit chapter fixed effects absorb these product characteristics
dummies.
34See e.g., Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and Manova and Zhang (2012) for studies using firm-level data and Baldwin
and Harrigan (2011), Bernard et al. (2007), Helble and Okubo (2008), and Johnson (2012) for studies using product-level
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results suggest that exporters need to produce high quality products to match with highly capable
importers.35
5.3 Alternative Explanations
US importer partner upgrading and Mexican exporter partner downgrading might be explained by
alternative hypotheses. This section discusses such alternative hypotheses and presents additional
evidence to show that these alternative hypotheses do not fully explain our results.
5.3.1 Negative Assortative Matching
We have focused on Case C of PAM and Case I of random matching in our model in the previous
sections. Appendix shows that Case S of NAM may predict our finding, β1 > 0, β4 > 0 and
β2 = β3 = 0 in the following two cases: Case A (A1), where the import volume of final producers
I(x) is monotonically decreasing in its own capability x, and (A2), where the number of Mexican
exiting exporters is sufficiently large. In Case B, (B1) the export volume of Mexican suppliers X(y)
is monotonically decreasing in its own capability y, and in (B2), the number of Mexican exiting
exporters is sufficiently small.
The conditions (A1) and (B1) are unlikely to be satisfied as they contradict a well-established
fact that when an industry is hit by a negative shock (e.g., tariff cuts), small firms are more likely to
exit than large firms. Note that even under NAM, firms with lower capability than xL and yL choose
to exit [see equation (7)]. Therefore, when firms are hit by a negative shock, those with the lowest
capability are more likely to exit, as in standard models with heterogeneous firms. When a firm’s
trade volume, which is proportional to its scale of operation, is strictly decreasing in its capability, the
model predicts that the largest traders are more likely to exit than small traders when their industry is
hit by a negative shock. This is the opposite of the well-established finding that small firms are more
likely to exit than large firms. Therefore, the case of NAM is unlikely to explain our findings.
5.3.2 Random Matching with Exogenous Breakups
Another alternative model that could predict β1 > 0 and β4 > 0 is a random matching model
with exogenous breakups. In this model, matches exogenously break up at some constant rate, and
data. In terms of the data, our study is close to that of Manova and Zhang (2012), who investigate positive correlations
between export volumes and unit prices across exporters and products. We also find a positive correlation between them in
our data.
35Estimates of β1 and β4 under the unit price ranking are smaller than those under the baseline ranking. This difference
might reflect the fact that exporters being differentiated by productivity or quality is not universal across products, but
heterogeneous across products (e.g., Baldwin and Ito, 2011; Mandel, 2009). Differentiating firms mainly by productivity
in some products would reduce the size of β1 and β4 .
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firms having lost their partners randomly match with each other. This combination of exogenous
breakup and random matching often appears in dynamic search models. The random matching may
create mean reversion: among firms who break up, firms that traded with low capability partners are
more likely to trade with high capability partners. In other words, (1) large firms are more likely to
downgrade partners in absence of the MFA shock. On the other hand, the MFA shock forced low
capability firms to stop exporting. Since our sample drops exiting exporters, (2) our sample is likely
to include highly capable large exporters in the treatment group. If (1) and (2) hold, they might
mechanically yield a higher probability of Mexican exporters’ partner downgrading in the treatment
group than in the control group. If this explains a positive estimate of β4, we cannot interpret it as
evidence of PAM based on complementarity.
This random matching model fails to account for the zero estimate of β3 in Tables 6. If this
hypothesis were true, Mexican exporters should upgrade more frequently in the control group, where
low-capability Mexican exporters survive at a greater rate than those in the treatment group. This
means that we should observe a negative and significant estimate of β3, but this is not the case. The
same argument applies to β1. Therefore, we reject this hypothesis.
5.3.3 Segment Switching
Another explanation for β1 > 0 and β4 > 0 is a model of product segment switching inspired by
Holmes and Stevens (2014). Even one HS-6 digit product category may have two different segments.
One “standardized” segment is produced on a large scale and sold with low markups, while the
other “custom” segment is produced on a small scale but sold with high markups. Suppose that
large US importers produce “standardized” products, while small US importers produce “custom”
products. Suppose that, as Holmes and Stevens (2014) argue, Chinese exporters enter mainly in
“standardized” products. If Mexican exporters switched from “standardized” to “custom” products to
escape competition from China, this change might be observed as Mexican exporters’ downgrading
and US importers’ upgrading in our regressions.36
To explore the validity of this “segment-switching” hypothesis, we perform three additional re-
gressions in Table ?? testing the following three predictions. If a firm’s trade volume in 2004 indicates
its segment, both small and large firms should respond to the end of the MFA in heterogeneous ways.
First, small “custom” US importers should increase their trade volume more rapidly than large “stan-
dardized” US importers, as small “custom” US importers should become more attractive to Mexican
36The existence of multiple segments within one product category does not change the interpretation of our main regres-
sions if Mexican firms do not switch segments. In the case of PAM, it still holds that Mexican exporters downgrade and US
importers upgrade their main partners in the “standardized” segment, while firms do not change partners in the “custom”
segment. On the other hand, the existence of multiple segments might help to explain why not all firms changed partners
even in the treatment group.
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exporters and able to match more capable Mexican exporters. Second, small “custom” US importers
should upgrade the main partners more frequently than large “standardized” US importers. Finally,
partner downgrading by Mexican exporters should be concentrated among those who initially traded
with large “standardized” US importers in 2004.
The results of our tests of these three predictions are presented in Table ??. Column (1) and
Column (2) shows the results of regressions of US importer’s import growth and US Importer Partner
Upgrading dummy, respectively, on a common set of variables: the Binding dummy, the firm’s 2004
rank (Own Rank2004) and the interaction of these two, together with HS-2 digit sector fixed effects.
Column (3) shows the result of regression of Mexican Exporter Partner Downgrading dummy on the
Binding dummy, the 2004 rank of partner US importers, and the interaction of these two, together
with HS-2 digit sector fixed effects. The heterogeneous responses of small firms and large firms
predicted by this alternative segment switching hypothesis should appear in the coefficients of the
interaction terms. However, all interaction terms are estimated small and statistically significant.
Thus, we conclude that this alternative hypothesis cannot explain our main results37
6 Conclusion
The heterogeneous firm trade literature successfully documented the heterogeneity of exporters and
importers in terms of capability, however our knowledge about how heterogeneous importers and ex-
porters trade with each other has been still limited. We have identified a simple mechanism determin-
ing exporter and importer matching at the product level: Becker-type positive assortative matching by
capability. We have found that when trade liberalization enables foreign suppliers to enter a market,
existing firms change partners so that matching becomes positively assortative under a new environ-
ment. Our model combining Becker (1973) and Melitz (2003) interprets this rematching as evidence
of a new source of gains from trade associated with firm heterogeneity.
The Becker mechanism has been applied to various topics in other fields of economics, but its
application for exporter–importer matching remains limited. We believe this mechanism potentially
emphasizes several questions that anonymous market models fail to address. For instance, our finding
suggests that many firms are willing to trade with highly capable firms, but only highly capable firms
can engage in such trade. This view that all importers are not equally valuable and available for
all exporters seems relevant for policy discussions that often encourage domestic firms to export,
particularly to highly capable foreign buyers.
37In addition to the evidence presented in Table ??, the segment switching hypothesis would not be consistent with our
finding of Mexican exporter partner downgrading under the unit price ranking in column (12) of Table 8. This finding
implies that a Mexican exporter switches from a US main importer of high price products to one of low price products.
This is inconsistent with the segment switching hypothesis where exporters switch from low price “standardized” to high
price “custom” products.
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Figure 1: Exporter-Importer Matching Graphs
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Note: Small dots in the left side and the right side of lines represent Mexican exporters
and US importers, respectively.Each solid line connecting an exporter and an importer
indicates that they transact the product during June to December 2004. Exporters and
importers are ordered by trade volume with their main partners for the product.
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Figure 2: Main-to-Main Shares for HS 6 Digit Textile/Apparel Products
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Figure 3: Case C: Positive Assortative Matching (PAM)
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Figure 4: Case C: the Response of Matching to an Entry of Chinese Exporters (dMC > 0)
1
00
1
F(x) G(y)
F(x)
G(m (x))x1
MM MC
Suppliers
Mexico China
dMCMU
Final Producers
The US
G(m (x))x0
A
B
C
D
Figure 5: Impacts of the end of the MFA on Chinese and Mexican textile/apparel exports to the US
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Products With Non-Binding Quota Products With Binding Quota
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
20
00
0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Chinese Exports to the US (Millions USD)
Year
Mexican Exports to the US (Millions USD)
Year
Note: The left panel shows export values in millions of US dollars from China to the US for the two
groups of textile/apparel products from 2000 to 2010. The dashed line represents the sum of export
values of all products upon which US had imposed binding quotas against China until the end of
2004, and the solid line represents that of the products with non-binding quotas. The right panel
expresses the same information for exports from Mexico to the US.
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Figure 6: Normalized ranks of 2004 and 2007 partners
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Note: The left panel draws the normalized ranks of main partners in 2004 and 2007 for those US
importers who change their main partners between 2004 and 2007. The right panel draws similar
partner ranks for Mexican exporters. The lines represent OLS fits.
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Table 1: Summary Statics for Product-Level Matching
HS-6 digit product level statistics, mean (median) 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1) N of Exporters 14.7 (8) 14.1(7) 11.7 (6) 11.3 (6)
(2) N of Importers 19.6 (11.5) 18.7 (10) 15.5 (9) 14.9 (9)
(3) N of Exporters Selling to an Importer 1.1 (1) 1.1 (1) 1.1 (1) 1.1 (1)
(4) N of Importers Buying from an Exporter 1.5 (1) 1.5 (1) 1.5 (1) 1.4 (1)
(5) Value Share of the Main Exporters (Exporters>1) 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77
(6) Value Share of the Main Importer (Importers>1) 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.76
Note: Each row reports mean statistics of indicated variables from 2004 to 2007, with median statistics in
parenthesis. Rows (1) and (2) indicate the numbers of Mexican exporters and US importers of a given product,
respectively. Row (3) indicates the number of Mexican exporters selling a given product to a given US importer.
Row (4) indicates the number of US importers buying a given product from a given Mexican exporter. Products
share of imports from the main Mexican exporters in terms of the importer’s product import volume. Row (6)
indicates the share of exports to the main US importers in terms of the exporter’s product export volume.
Statistics in Rows (5) and (6) are calculated only for firms with multiple partners.
Table 2: Main-to-Main Shares in Mexico’s Textile/Apparel exports to the US
Main-to-Main Share
Year All
Maquila Non-Maquila
Quota-bound Quota-free
Exporters Exporetrs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2004 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.80
2005 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.79
2006 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.82
2007 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.85
Note: Each column reports main-to-main shares in Mexico’s textile/apparel exports to the US
for types of transactions. “All” indicates all textile/apparel products. “Maquila” indicates
Maquiladora/IMMEX transactions, whereas “Non-Maquila” indicates the other normal transactions.
“Quota-bound” indicates products for which Chinese exports to the US were subject to binding
quotas, while “Quota-free” indicates the other products. See section 4.3 for the definition of quota
binding.
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Table 3: Baseline Regressions
A: US Importer’s Partner Changes during 2004-07
UpgradingUS(β1) DowngradingUS (β2)
Linear Prob. Probit Linear Prob. Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Binding 0.052** 0.052*** -0.017 -0.017
(0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.024)
Sector FE (HS2) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 718 707 718 707
B: Mexican Exporter’s Partner Changes during 2004-07
UpgradingMex(β3) DowngradingMex (β4)
Linear Prob. Probit Linear Prob. Probit
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Binding -0.003 -0.003 0.127*** 0.150***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.035) (0.044)
Sector FE (HS2) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 601 522 601 601
Note: The dependent variablesUpgradingcigsandDowngrading
c
igs are dummy variables indicating whether during 2004-
07 firm i in country c switched the main partner of HS-6 digit product g in country c′ to the one with a higher capability
rank and to the one with a lower capability rank, respectively [c=Mexico and c′=US in Panel A; c=US and c′=Mexico in
Panel B]. Bindinggs is a dummy variable indicating whether product g from China faced a binding US import quota in
2004. All regressions include HS-2 digit (sector) fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at
the HS-6 digit product level. Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
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Table 4: Regressions with Additional Controls
Partner Changes during 2004-07: Linear Probability Models
US Importers Mexican Exporters
UpgradingUS(β1) Downgrading
Mex(β4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Binding 0.052*** 0.053** 0.049** 0.127** 0.127*** 0.123***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.044) (0.035) (0.038)
Maquila Ratio -0.015 -0.025
(0.017) (0.024)
Log Volume2004 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.007)
Sector FE (HS2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 718 718 718 601 601 601
US Importers Mexican Exporters
UpgradingUS(β1) Downgrading
Mex(β4)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Binding 0.042* 0.048** 0.053** 0.130*** 0.117*** 0.095***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033)
Intermediary only 0.007 0.038
(0.013) (0.036)
Intermediary plus 0.016 -0.027
Production (0.021) (0.043)
Product Characteristics Yes Yes
Mexican State FE Yes Yes
Sector FE (HS2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 718 707 672 601 588 559
Note: The dependent variablesUpgradingcigsandDowngrading
c
igs are dummy variables indicating whether during 2004-
07 firm i in country c switched the main partner of HS-6 digit product g in country c′ to the one with a higher capability
rank and to the one with a lower capability rank, respectively [c=Mexico and c′=US in columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9); i=US
and j=Mexico in columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12)]. Bindinggs is a dummy variable indicating whether product g from China
faced a binding US import quota in 2004. MaquilaRatioig is the share of duty free processing trade (Maquiladora) in
firm i′s trade volume of product g with the main partner in 2004. V olume2004ig is firm i’s trade volume in 2004. Product
Characteristics are a collection of dummy variables indicating whether products are Men’s, Women’s, cotton, wool and
man-made (chemical). All regressions include HS-2 digit (sector) fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and clustered at the HS-6 digit product level. Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
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Table 5: Initial Ranks and Partner Changes
Partner Changes during 2004-07: Linear Probability Models
US Importers Mexican Exporters
UpgradingUS(β1) Downgrading
Mex(β4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Binding 0.052*** 0.041** 0.127** 0.130***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.044) (0.049)
Rank 2004 -0.001 -0.087
(Normalized) (0.024) (0.054)
Binding* 0.034 -0.018
Rank2004 (0.049) (0.087)
Sector FE (HS2) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 718 718 601 601
Note: The dependent variablesUpgradingcigsandDowngrading
c
igs are dummy variables indicating whether during 2004-
07 firm i in country c switched the main partner of HS-6 digit product g in country c′ to the one with a higher capability rank
and to the one with a lower capability rank, respectively [c=Mexico and c′=US in columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9); i=US and
j=Mexico in columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12)]. Bindinggs is a dummy variable indicating whether product g from China
faced a binding US import quota in 2004. All regressions include HS-2 digit (sector) fixed effects. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses and clustered at the HS-6 digit product level. Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
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Table 6: Trade Ranks and Exit from the US market
Mexican Exporter’s Exit from the US market: OLS
Exitrigs
Period 1 2001-04 2002-04 2000-04
Period 2 2004-07 2004-06 2004-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Binding -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.037** -0.037*** -0.019 -0.027***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
After2004 -0.361*** -0.348*** -0.454*** -0.442*** -0.262*** -0.245***
(0.042) (0.036) (0.049) (0.042) (0.030) (0.028)
Binding* 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.044** 0.042*** 0.032** 0.035*
After2004 (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.189)
lnExport -0.058*** -0.062*** -0.078*** -0.080*** -0.045*** -0.048***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lnExport* 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.012*** 0.017***
After2004 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Maquila Ratio 0.080*** 0.054*** 0.075***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
Maquila Ratio* -0.147*** -0.142*** -0.124***
After2004 (0.017) (0.019) (0.013)
Product
Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE (HS2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 22625 22624 20655 20655 24474 24474
Note: The dependent variableExittigsandDowngrading
c
igs are dummy variables indicating whether during 2004-07 firm
i in country c switched the main partner of HS-6 digit product g in country c′ to the one with a higher capability rank
and to the one with a lower capability rank, respectively [c=Mexico and c′=US in columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9); i=US and
j=Mexico in columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12)]. Bindinggs is a dummy variable indicating whether product g from China
faced a binding US import quota in 2004. All regressions include HS-2 digit (sector) fixed effects. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses and clustered at the HS-6 digit product level. Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
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Table 7: Partner Changes in Different Periods
A: Gradual Partner Changes
Partner Changes in Different Periods: Linear Probability Models
US Importers Mexican Exporters
UpgradingUS(β1) DowngradingMex (β4)
2004-06 2004-07 2004-08 2004-06 2004-07 2004-08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Binding 0.036** 0.052** 0.066** 0.056* 0.127*** 0.121***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.027) (0.031) (0.035) (0.032)
Sector FE (HS2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 964 718 515 767 601 442
B: Placebo Checks
Partner Changes in Different Periods: Linear Probability Models
US Importers Mexican Exporters
UpgradingUS(β1) DowngradingMex (β4)
2007-11 2008-11 2009-11 2007-11 2008-11 2009-11
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Binding -0.001 0.027** -0.000 -0.008 0.047 0.005
(0.018) (0.011) (0.006) (0.036) (0.031) (0.020)
Sector FE (HS2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 449 575 747 393 499 655
Note: The dependent variables Upgradingcigsand Downgrading
c
igs are dummy variables indicating whether during the
period indicated by each column, firm i in country c switched the main partner of HS-6 digit product g in country c′ to the
one with a higher capability rank and to the one with a lower capability rank, respectively [c=Mexico and c′=US in (1)-(3)
and (7)-(9); c=US and c′=Mexico in (4)-(6) and (10)-(12)]. Bindinggs is a dummy variable indicating whether product g
from China faced a binding US import quota in 2004. All regressions include HS-2 digit (sector) fixed effects. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the HS-6 digit product level. Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, ***
1 percent.
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Table 8: Partner Changes and Alternative Capability Rankings
Partner Changes during 2004-07: Linear Probability Models
US importers
UpgradingUS(β1) DowngradingUS (β2)
Baseline Total Trade Price Baseline Total Trade Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Binding 0.052** 0.052** 0.045** -0.017 -0.017 -0.011
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024)
Sector FE (HS2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 718 718 706 718 718 706
Mexican Exporters
UpgradingMex(β3) DowngradingMex (β4)
Baseline Total Trade Price Baseline Total Trade Price
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Binding -0.003 0.001 0.041 0.127*** 0.123*** 0.067**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.027)
Sector FE (HS2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 601 601 591 601 601 591
Note: The dependent variablesUpgradingcigsandDowngrading
c
igs are dummy variables indicating whether during 2004-
07, firm i in country c switched the main partner of HS-6 digit product g in country c′ to the one with a higher capability
rank and to the one with a lower capability rank, respectively (c=Mexico and c′=US in (1)-(6); c=US and c′=Mexico in
(7)-(12)). Columns differ in variables on which rankings of capability are based. (Baseline: firm i’s trade volume of product
g with the main partner in 2004; Total Trade: firm i’s trade volume of product g in 2004; Price: unit prices of product g
in firm’s trade with the main partner). Bindinggs is a dummy variable indicating whether product g from China faced a
binding US import quota in 2004. All regressions include HS-2 digit (sector) fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and clustered at the HS-6 digit product level. Significance: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
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Appendix
A.1 Negative Assortative Matching
In Case S, the market clearing condition becomes
MU [1− F (x)] = (MM +MC) [G (mx (x))−G(yL)] . (11)
The left hand side is the mass of final producers with capabilities higher than x and the right hand side
is the mass of suppliers with lower capability than mx(x). Figure 7 describes the matching market
clearing condition (11). The left rectangle for suppliers is described as in Figure 3. The right rectangle
describes the rectangle for US final producers from Figure 3 but inverted. Therefore, a lower position
in the rectangle expresses higher capability. The right gray area is equal to the mass of US final
producers whose capability is between mx(x) and yL. The matching market clearing condition (11)
requires the two gray areas to have the same size for all x.
Suppose the mass of Chinese suppliers increases (dMC > 0). In Case S, the change in matching
is complex as the matching market clearing condition now includes the cut-off of suppliers yL. We
consider a normal case in which the cut-off of suppliers increases from y0L to y
1
L due to increased
competition.
Figure 8 describes how importers with capability x change partner from m0x(x) to m
1
x(x) when
yL is fixed at the pre-liberalization level y0L. The figure looks similar to Figure 4 for the case of PAM.
Area A in Figure 8 expresses US importers with capabilities higher than x. These final producers
initially match with suppliers with capabilities lower than m0x(x), whose mass is expressed by areas
B + C. After the entry of Chinese exporters, more suppliers at given capability level are available to
US final producers. The original matches becomes unstable. In a new matching, final producers in
area A matches with areas B+D, which have the same size and represent suppliers with capabilities
lower than m1x(x). The figure shows that any US final producer with given capability x downgrades
its supplier from one with capability m0x(x) to one with capability m
1
x (x). In turn, consider Mexican
suppliers and existing Chinese suppliers with capability m1(x). They used to match with final pro-
ducers with capabilities higher than x (in the interior of area A), but downgrade partners to ones with
the lower capability x. In sum, all of US final producers, Mexican suppliers, and incumbent Chinese
suppliers downgrade their partners.
The increase in yL adds another effect. Under NAM, final producers with maximum capability
xmax match with suppliers with the new cut-off y1L. As these final producers used to match with sup-
pliers with the old cut-off y0L, this indicates that final producers with the maximum capability upgrade
their partners. This in turn means that suppliers with the new cut-off y1L upgrade their partners, too.
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These two examples show that in contrast to the case where yL does not change, some final producers
and suppliers upgrade partners when yL increases.
Figure 9 shows a threshold cut-off level x˜ such that final produces with capability x˜ neither
upgrade nor downgrade their partners. In the figure, x˜ is chosen so that the size of area C, the mass
of exiting suppliers, is equal to the size of area D, the mass of Chinese entrants with lower capability
than m0x(x˜). Final producers with higher capability than x˜ in area A used to match with suppliers
in area B + C. After the Chinese entry, they match with suppliers in area B + D. As areas C and
D have the same size, we have m0x(x˜) = m
1
x(x˜). Notice that the mass of the Chinese entrants with
capabilities lower than y is smaller than the mass of exiting suppliers (area C) if y < m0x(x˜), while
it is larger if y > m0x(x˜). Therefore, For x > x˜ and y < m
0
x(x˜), US final producers and existing
suppliers both upgrade their partners. For x < x˜ and y > m0x(x˜), US final producers and existing
suppliers both downgrade their partners. Finally, the figure also shows that the threshold x˜ decreases
in the mass of exiting suppliers and increases in the mass of new Chinese entrants.
Proposition 3. If the mass of Chinese suppliers increases in Case C, then a threshold capability x˜
of final producers exists such that: (1) US final producers with x > x˜ and suppliers that matched
with them switch their partners to those with higher capability (partner upgrading); (2) US final
producers with x < x˜ and suppliers that matched with them switch their partners to those with lower
capability (partner downgrading); and (3) the threshold x˜ decreases in the mass of exiting suppliers
and increases in the mass of new Chinese entrants.
Implications for our regressions
Our strategy to proxy capability ranking by trade volume rankings relies on the monotonicity be-
tween firm’s capability and trade volume. This monotonicity may not hold in the case of NAM. The
derivatives of final producers’ import volume, I(x) = T (x,mx(x)), and suppliers’ export volume,
I(y) = T (my(y), y), with respect to their capabilities are
I ′(x) =
∂T
∂x
+
∂T
∂y
m′x(x) and X
′(y) =
∂T
∂x
m′y(y) +
∂T
∂y
.
The signs of I ′(x) and X ′(y) are generally ambiguous since ∂T/∂x > 0, ∂T/∂mx(x) > 0, and
m′x(x) < 0.
Without loss of generality, we can consider three cases: (1) I(x) is non-monotonic in x; (2) I(x)
is monotonically increasing in x; (3) I(x) is monotonically decreasing in x. For each case, consider
what we should observe in estimates of βi from our regression. Proposition 3 shows the direction of
partner changes depends on the threshold x˜. Therefore, we also consider three cases: (a) x˜ is low so
that most final producers have higher capability than x˜ ; (b) x˜ is high so that most final producers have
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higher capability than x˜; (c) x˜ is intermediate so that final producers are equally divided those with
capability x > x˜ and those with x < x˜. Therefore, there are in total 3*3=9 cases to be considered.
Table 9 summarizes what each of the nine cases predicts on the signs of βi in our regressions.
First, if I(x) is non-monotonic, then export volume X(y) is also non-monotonic. In this case, we
should observe, in the treatment group, partner changes in both directions so that βi > 0 for all
equations i = 1, ..., 4. Second, if x˜ is intermediate, some of firms upgrade partners while others
downgrade. Again, in this case, we should observe, in the treatment group, partner changes in both
directions regardless of how we rank firms. Therefore, this case also predicts βi > 0 for i = 1, ..., 4.
Third, suppose I(x) is decreasing. This means that X(y) = I(my(y)) is increasing since X ′(y) =
I ′(my(y))m′y(y) > 0 from m′y < 0. The ranking of US final producers by import volume is the
exact opposite of the true capability ranking, but the ranking of Mexican exporters by export volume
agrees with the true capability ranking. Proposition 3 implies that for x > x˜, we should observe in
the treatment group partner downgrading by US final producers and partner upgrading by Mexican
exporters for the treatment group. Therefore, if x˜ is low, we should observe β2 > 0,β3 > 0, and
β1 = β4 ' 0. On the other hand, for x < x˜, we should observe in the treatment group partner
upgrading by US final producers and partner downgrading by Mexican exporters. Therefore, if x˜ is
high, we should observe β1 > 0, β4 > 0, and β2 = β3 ' 0. Finally, suppose I(x) is increasing. This
means thatX(y) = I(my(y)) is decreasing sinceX ′(y) = I ′(my(y))m′y(y) < 0. The ranking of US
final producers by import volume agrees with the true capability ranking, but the ranking of Mexican
exporters by export volume is the exact opposite of the true capability ranking. Proposition 3 implies
that for x > x˜, we should observe in the treatment group partner upgrading by US final producers
and partner downgrading by Mexican exporters. Therefore, if x˜ is low, we should observe β1 > 0,
β4 > 0, and β2 = β3 ' 0. On the other hand, for x < x˜, we should observe in the treatment group
partner downgrading by US final producers and partner upgrading by Mexican exporters. Therefore,
if x˜ is high, we should observe β2 > 0, β3 > 0, and β1 = β4 ' 0.
From Table 9, Case S can predict our finding β1 > 0, β4 > 0, and β2 = β3 ' 0 in the following
two cases. Case A: (A1) import volumes of final producers I(x) are monotonically decreasing in
their own capability x and (A2) the number of Mexican suppliers who stop exporting is sufficiently
small [i.e. x˜ is high ]. Case B: (B1) export volumes of Mexican suppliers X(y) are monotonically
decreasing in their own capability y [i.e. I(x) is monotonically increasing in x] and (B2) the number
of Mexican suppliers who stop exporting is sufficiently large [i.e. x˜ is low].
A.2 Data Construction
Customs transaction data Our primary data set is a Mexican customs transaction data set for
Mexican textile/apparel exports to the US. The data set is created from the administrative records
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held on every transaction crossing the Mexican border from June 2004 to December 2011. The
Mexican customs agency requires both individuals and firms who ship goods across the border to
submit a customs form (pedimento aduanal in Spanish) that must be prepared by an authorized agent.
The form contains information on: (1) total value of shipment (in US dollars); (2) 8 digit HS product
code (we use from HS50 to HS63); (3) quantity; (4) name, address, and tax identification number of
the Mexican exporter; (5) name, address, and tax identification number (employment identification
number, EIN) of the US importer, and other information.
Assign firm IDs We assigned identification numbers to both Mexican exporters and US importers
(exporter-ID and importer-ID) throughout the data set. It is straightforward to assign exporter-IDs for
Mexican exporters since the Mexican tax number uniquely identifies each Mexican firm. However,
a challenge arises in assigning importer-IDs for US firms. It is known that one US firm often has
multiple names, addresses, and EINs. This happens because a firm sometimes uses multiple names
or changes names, owns multiple plants, and changes tax numbers. Therefore, simply matching firms
by one of three linking variables (names, addresses, and EINs) would wrongly assign more than one
ID to one US buyer and would result in overestimating the number of US buyers for each Mexican
exporter.
We used a series of methods developed in the record linkage research for data cleaning to assign
importer-ID.38 First, as the focus of our study is firm-to-firm matching, we dropped transactions for
which exporters were individuals and courier companies (e.g., FedEx, UPS, etc.). Second, a com-
pany name often included generic words that did not help identify a particular company such as legal
terms (e.g., “Co.”, “Ltd.”, etc.) and words commonly appearing in the industry (e.g., “apparel”). We
removed these words from company names. Third, we standardized addresses using the software,
ZP4, which received a CASS certification of address cleaning from the United States Postal Services.
Fourth, we prepared lists of fictitious names, previous names and name abbreviations, a list of ad-
dresses of company branches, and a list of EINs from data on company information, Orbis made by
Bureau van Dijk, which covered 20 millions company branches, subsidiaries, and headquarters in
the US. We used Orbis information for manufacturing firms and intermediary firms (wholesalers and
retailers) due to the capacity of our workstation. For each HS2 digit industry, we matched names
within customs data and names between customs data and name lists from Orbis mentioned above;
we conducted similar matches for addresses and EINs. In conducting our matching, we used fuzzy
matching techniques allowing small typographical errors.39 Fifth, using matched relations and soft-
38An excellent textbook for record linkage is Herzog, Scheuren, and Winkler (2007). A webpage of “Virtual
RDC@Cornell” (http://www2.vrdc.cornell.edu/news/) at Cornell University is also a great source of information on data
cleaning. We particularly benefitted from lecture slides on “Record Linkage” by John Abowd and Lars Vilhuber.
39We used the Jaro-Winkler metric in the Record Linkage package of R and other methods, which will be explained in
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ware using network theory, we created clusters of information (names, addresses, EINs) in which one
cluster identifies one firm. We identified a cluster basically under a rule that each entry in a cluster
fuzzy matches with some other entries in the cluster through two of three linking variables (names,
addresses, EINs). Finally, we assigned importer-IDs for each cluster.
A3. Solving the Model
Consumer Maximization
The representative consumer maximizes the following utility function:
U =
δ
ρ
ln
[ˆ
ω∈Ω
θ(ω)αq(ω)ρdω
]
+ q0 s.t.
ˆ
ω∈Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dω + q0 = I.
This is equivalent with maximizing
U =
δ
ρ
ln
[ˆ
ω∈Ω
θ(ω)αq(ω)ρdω
]
−
ˆ
ω∈Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dω + I.
The first-order conditions are
δθ (ω)α q (ω)ρ−1´
ω′∈Ω θ(ω
′)αq(ω′)ρdω′
= p (ω) . (12)
For any two varieties ω and ω′, we have(
θ (ω′)
θ (ω)
)α(q(ω′)
q (ω)
)ρ−1
=
p(ω′)
p(ω)(
θ (ω′)
θ (ω)
)α ρ
ρ−1
(
q(ω′)
q (ω)
)ρ
=
(
p(ω′)
p(ω)
) ρ
ρ−1
(
θ (ω′)
θ (ω)
)α(1−σ)(q(ω′)
q (ω)
)ρ
=
(
p(ω′)
p(ω)
)1−σ
θ(ω′)αq(ω′)ρ =
(
p(ω′)
p(ω)
)1−σ θ (ω′)ασ
θ (ω)α(σ−1)
q(ω)ρ
the next version.
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Integrating both sides with respect to ω′ ∈ Ω, we obtain
ˆ
ω′∈Ω
θ(ω′)αq(ω′)ρdω′ =
q(ω)ρ
θ(ω)α(σ−1)p (ω)1−σ
ˆ
ω′∈Ω
θ(ω′)ασp(ω′)1−σdω′.
=
q(ω)ρ
θ(ω)α(σ−1)p (ω)1−σ
P 1−σ,
where P ≡ [´ω∈Ω p(ω)1−σθ (ω)ασ dω]1/(1−σ) is the price index. Substituting this into (12), we
obtain the following demand function:
δθ (ω)α q (ω)ρ−1´
ω′∈Ω θ(ω
′)αq(ω′)ρdω′
= p (ω)
δθ (ω)α q (ω)ρ−1
(
θ(ω)α(σ−1)p (ω)1−σ
q(ω)ρP 1−σ
)
= p (ω)
q(ω) =
δθ (ω)ασ
P 1−σ
p(ω)−σ. (13)
Team profit maximization
Facing the demand function (13), teams choose prices under monopolistic competition. Let A ≡
δ
σ
(
ρP
c
)σ−1
and γ ≡ ασ − β (σ − 1). Since a team with capability θ has marginal costs cθβ , it
chooses the optimal price p(θ) = cθ
β
ρ . Team’s output q (θ), revenue R(θ), costs C(θ), and profits
Π(θ) become
q (θ) = δP σ−1
(ρ
c
)σ
θ(α−β)σ;
R(θ) = p(θ)q (θ)
= δ
(
ρP
c
)σ−1
θ(α−β)σ+β
= σAθγ ;
C(θ) = cθβq (θ) + f
=
δ
ρ
(
ρP
c
)σ−1
θ(α−β)σ+β + f
= (σ − 1)Aθγ + f ;
Π (θ) = R(θ)− C(θ) = Aθγ − f.
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Normalizeγ = 1. From the optimal price, the price index is
P =
[ˆ
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−σθ (ω)ασ dω
]1/(1−σ)
=
c
ρ
[ˆ
ω∈Ω
θ (ω)γ dω
]1/(1−σ)
=
c
ρ
[ˆ
ω∈Ω
θ (ω) dω
]1/(1−σ)
.
=
c
ρ
Θ1/(1−σ),
where Θ ≡ ´ω∈Ω θ (ω) dω is a measure of the aggregate capability. Then, the index A becomes
A =
δ
σ
(
ρP
c
)σ−1
=
δ
σΘ
.
From equilibrium matching, Θ is obtained as
Θ =
MU
´∞
xL
θ (x,mx(x)) dF (x) for Case-C
MU
´∞
xL
θx(x)dF (x) + (MM +MC)
´∞
yL
θy(y)dG(y) for Case-I,
where θ (x, y) = θx (x) + θy (y) for additive separable Case I.
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Figure 7: Case S: Negative Assortative Matching (NAM))
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Figure 9: Case S: the Response of Matching to an Entry of Chinese Exporters (dMC > 0).
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Figure 8: Case S: the Response of Matching to Entry of Chinese Exporters (dMC > 0) if yL = 0.
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Table 9: The Prediction of Case S on the Signs of βi in Our Regressions
I(x)
Non-monotonic Decreasing Increasing
Low x˜
βi > 0(i = 1, .., 4)
β2 > 0,β3 > 0,β1 = β4 ' 0 β1 > 0,β4 > 0,β2 = β3 ' 0
High x˜ β1 > 0,β4 > 0,β2 = β3 ' 0 β2 > 0,β3 > 0,β1 = β4 ' 0
Intermediate x˜ βi > 0 (i = 1, .., 4)
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